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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the Interna-
tional Hellenic University. 
Using financial data before and after the recent crisis, I have conducted a unique panel 
dataset of approximately 33 banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
With the intention of evaluating and assessing the impact of securitisation on the fi-
nancial performance of these banks, I analyse the regression output of a securitisation 
index, number of deals per year, on ratios that denote bank profitability, liquidity and 
financial stability in the fields of risk and efficiency.  On average my results indicate 
that only profitability and capital adequacy are affected by the presence of securitisa-
tion.  Return on average assets (ROAA) is found positive affected by securitisation 
deals, while Tier I is proved to have a negative relationship.  Although, the sample size 
is small and the explanatory power is limited, the regression results confirm previous 
empirical findings of the related literature and so partially does the comparative analy-
sis of these two ratios among the examined countries.           
I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Theothoros Syriopoulos, for his constant 
support and encouraging and valuable comments during my work on this dissertation.  
I also thank my family and my partner, Christos Vathilakis, who patiently stood by me 
in every difficult and pleasant moment of this wonderful journey.      
Keywords: securitisation, bank performance, ratio analysis, PIIGS. 
 
Olympia Ntouma  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Securitisation is denominated as the process of pooling together several types of loans, 
transferring them to separate entities, special purpose vehicles, in order to issue mar-
ketable securities backed on these loans.  These securities, called asset backed securi-
ties (ABS) are then sold to investors who receive regular cash flows from the capital 
and interest payments of the loan holders.  This innovative technique includes risk 
transferring from financial institutions to final investors and balance sheet restructur-
ing.   
The securitisation market in Europe was developed rapidly before the subprime 
mortgage loan crisis.  Especially, between 2008 and 2009 it reached the highest 
amount of outstanding, more than 2 trillion EUR.  It is claimed that the expeditious in-
crease of the securitisation activity was the main cause of the financial crisis of 2008.  
Before 2008, securitisation was thought to have contributed to the financial stability of 
the banking system because banks were able to better manage their risk through di-
versification, to find new sources of funding, to increase their profitability and to im-
prove their liquidity and capital ratios.  When the financial crisis burst out and the bor-
rowers stopped servicing their loans, these novel funding technique revealed the un-
derlined risk backed to securities.  The latter experienced tremendous volatility and 
downfall in their prices.  The originating banks, being unable to cover the required cap-
ital needs derived from this unexpected change in the payment schedule, were obliged 
to rearrange the assets backed securities on their financial statements.  Subsequently, 
they resulted in liquidity problems and losses1.   
The financial crisis that started in USA in 2007 due to mortgage backed securi-
ties has become global and destabilized the banking system.  What was the reaction of 
the Greek credit institutions to this incident? The securitisation activities in Greece 
started in November 2003.  There was an extremely increase in 2006 which continued 
                                                     
1 European Banking Authority Report on Qualifying Securitisation, Response to the 
Commission’s Call for Advice of January 2014 on Long-Term Financing, available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-issues-advice-on-securitisation  
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until 2009.  Afterwards, a gradual decrease in the securitisation operations was ob-
served.  The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate, estimate and analyse the im-
pact of securitisation in the Greek Banking System.  The main questions are: 
 How bank performance, deposits and loans are affected by securitisation? 
 What is the role of securitisation in the financial stability in terms of risk and ef-
ficiency of Greek banks? 
 Comparison with evidence from main banks in Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain. 
Since there is no previous research about the securitisation consequences in 
the banks of Greece and other European Periphery countries, I decided to investigate 
this subject.  Using financial data of thirty three banks from the aforementioned coun-
tries, I evaluate via regression analysis the impact of securitisation on profitability, li-
quidity, performance and risk exposure ratios.  Moreover, I compare the statistically 
significant ratios among the five countries using graphs that illustrate the trend of the 
ratios over time.   
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 presents in detail 
the process of securitisation and the legal framework in Greece and the European Un-
ion.  Chapter 3 debates the relevant literature.  Chapter 4 the describes the methodol-
ogy, the variables and the empirical models applied.  Chapter 5 analyses the empirical 
findings and the comparison among the countries.  Chapter 6 concludes and recom-
mends on limitations.    
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Chapter 2: Legal and Theoretical Background  
It is essential to analyse the theoretical and legal framework of the securitisation pro-
cess before I present the literature review.     
2.1. Process of Securitisation  
Securitisation is defined as the procedure that enables credit transfer from financial 
institutions to final investors.  The process consists of collecting several types of loans, 
transferring them to separate legal entities called special purpose vehicles (SPV) in or-
der to issue marketable securities backed on these loans.  The diversified loan portfoli-
os can include illiquid existing or upcoming debt receivables, both retail, like mortgag-
es, commercial and residential, auto and consumer loans and credit cards, and also 
wholesale, like corporate loans.  The cash flow payments and the accounting values of 
these bank assets are switched to fund the payments of the new issued securities.  
Those securities are then sold to investors who receive the regular cash flows from the 
capital and interest payments made by the loan holders. 
In more detail, the securitisation process contains two stages.  In the first step, 
the financial institution or a company providing income-generating products, called 
the originator, has already offered specific types of loans mentioned above, chooses 
which of these assets are going to be removed from its balance sheet and pooled in 
the reference portfolio.  Thereupon, the originator sells this asset portfolio to the spe-
cial purpose vehicle.  This is a legal entity established by a bank or a non-financial firm, 
the aforementioned originator, to accomplish the securitisation transaction.  This enti-
ty has no other purpose but to issue the securities of the specific transaction.  Moreo-
ver, its governance framework has been formed in advance based on the limits of each 
situation, it cannot make any essential decisions upon its functions and has no built 
natural presence (Gordon and Souleles, 2005).  In the second phase, the debt, trada-
ble, bearing interest securities, backed with the assets of the originator, are issued in 
the capital markets and sold to investors.  The earnings from the issuance are em-
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ployed by the special purpose vehicle to reimburse the loans to the originator bank 
(Altunbas, Kara and Ozkan, 2014).  The investors get fixed or floating interest pay-
ments deriving from the initial borrowers’ payback scheme.  Usually the originator col-
lects the cash flows from the borrowers and transfers them, less by a servicing fee, to 
the investors.  A simple structure of a securitisation transaction is presented in Figure 
1, below.   
 
 
 Sale of assets 
 
 
       Profits of sale of assets 
  
Loans                             ABS Cash 
                          Principal and Interest 
                          
 
 
Figure 1: Securitisation Transaction Scheme 
An asset-backed security must be traded based on its risk.  Therefore a third 
party or even the originator enhance the reference portfolio by dividing it into various 
tranches regarding the level of risk, interest and maturity, with the purpose of increas-
ing the range of potential investors (Wighton, 2005).  The underwriter provides sup-
port in the forming of these tranches in two categories, secured notes and equity, and 
acts as an intermediate between the special purpose vehicle and the capital market 
investors.  The final investors that prefer the debt-like notes (secured) receive priority 
claim to the backed portfolio of loans according to a granted degree while the issuers 
hold an equity note of illiquid assets to cover possible first losses (Jobst, 2005).   Fur-
thermore, credit rating agencies are involved in the process at the issuance stage, rat-
ing independently the securities, taking into account the credit enhancements.  By its 
Originator  
Special 
Purpose 
Vehicle  
Investors Borrowers 
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very nature, securitisation is a substitute and diversified way of finance via transfer-
ring of credit risk from banks, originators, to final investors.    
The securitisation transactions are appointed in two types, traditional and syn-
thetic.  Traditional transactions, or “true sales”, take place when the originator sells 
the underlying assets to the special purpose vehicle and, as a result, they are detached 
from the financial statements.  Alternatively, in the synthetic transaction, the underly-
ing assets are presented on the balance sheet of the originator but their imposed risk 
is transmitted to the special purpose vehicle with the use of credit derivatives (Pinto, 
2014).  In this case, a sale of the assets does not occur, no cash flows are directed to 
the lender bank and the special purpose vehicle only holds the related risk without re-
taining the securitised assets.  In the next part of this chapter, a brief history of the 
regulations about securitisation in Greece and the European Union is presented.   
2.2. Legal framework of Securitisation   
The first law that was established in Greece and was related to securitized claims was 
3156/2003 (Government Gazette 157 A’) published on June, 25th 20032.  This Law co-
vers the framework of bond loans, securitisation claims and claims from real estate.  
Article 10 explains the process of securitisation regarding the issuance and distribu-
tion, only by private placement, of bonds that are redeemed by the collection of the 
transferred business funds or loans, credits and financial derivatives.  Moreover, in the 
paragraphs of this Article the main parts involved, the originator, the special purpose 
vehicle (SPV), which is the acquirer and also the bond issuer, and the investor are well 
defined along with their obligations and the legal rights at any case.   
The securitisation of real estate claims is presented in Article 11 of the same 
law and refers to the transfer of property due to the sale by a written agreement be-
tween the originator and the acquirer.  This process is combined with the issuance and 
private placement of bonds priced at least at €100,000.00 face value.  The special pur-
                                                     
2 Law 3156/2003 “On Bond Loans, Securitisation of Claims and of Claims from Real Es-
tate”, Greek Government Gazette 157 A’, 25th June 2003.  
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pose vehicle (SPV) must be established in Greece or in another member of the Europe-
an Economic Area.  Greece as a member of the European Union is subject to European 
regulations, the Basel Accords and Parliament directives, the most significant of which 
are analysed in the next paragraphs.     
The capital requirements proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
visor, Basel Capital Accord of 1988 known as Basel I, and the following revisions, has 
led financial institutions to discover new techniques, like securitisation, to reduce their 
cost of capital.  In order to fulfil the regulatory requirements about risk exposure, 
banks preferred to securitize their loans with high rating and keep on balance sheet 
the riskier ones.  As a result, the securitisation market had experienced very rapid evo-
lution after the 1990s.  Then, aiming for stronger financial stability, the Basel Commit-
tee proposed a new series of regulation regarding the capital adequacy of the banks 
and reflecting their actual risk exposure originated from securitisation activities.  This 
new revised accord was published on June 2004, included the Securitisation Frame-
work, which resulted from the prior provisions in the 3rd Consultative Paper to the New 
Basel Accord (April 2003) and consequent Changes to the Securitisation Framework 
(January 2004), discriminated the standardised approach and the internal ratings-
based approach.  These approaches are applied by the banks to calculate the capital 
charge for the securitisation exposure by “multiplying the notional amount of the 
transaction by a risk-weight applied to the capital ratio of 8%” (Jobst, 2005c).  
Next on July, 14th 2004, a Proposal for Directives of the European Parliament 
and Council was published.  It was titled “Re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions and Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 
1993 on the capital adequacy of investment”3 and in Articles 94-101 an integrated se-
ries of guidelines about capital requirements for securitisation transactions was firstly 
announced.  Through this directive, the financial organisations were able to exploit 
their options to other source of funding and achieve more efficient accounting man-
agement.  Furthermore, this directive was thought to restrict the arbitrage opportuni-
                                                     
3 Available in http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52004PC0486  
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ties derived from securitisation activities.  All types of securitisation, traditional and 
synthetic, as well as the terminology of these transactions were described conceptually 
and in detail. 
At the same time with the US subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, the Basel 
Committee acknowledged the necessity of more stringent regulation regarding insuffi-
cient liquidity and increased leverage in the banking sector.  Therefore, the Principles 
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision4 were published in September 
2008 and a few months later, in July 2009, the Enhancements to the Basel II Frame-
work5 recommended increased risk weights for re-securitisation exposures to comply 
with the risk associated in such activities and announced more severe credit rating 
analysis that should be implemented by the banks regarding securitisation transac-
tions.  Basel II was designed to diminish the capital arbitrage techniques related to se-
curitisation and in Pillar I, a set of directions for banking supervision on the dual nature 
of the banks, as originators and issuers, was presented.  In a securitisation transaction 
a bank can securitise its assets, so called originator, or purchases and owns the mar-
ketable securities, acting as an investor.   Moreover, both traditional and synthetic 
transactions were then subject to Basel Accord II6.   
In 2010, discussions and proposals regarding novel capital and liquidity stand-
ards for financial institutions lead to a new Basel Accord.  These were the Basel III: In-
ternational framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring7 and 
Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems.8 
This framework aimed to improve and reinforce the three pillars appointed in Basel II 
and especially for securitisation issues related to risk coverage, risk management and 
supervision and market discipline.  In particular, pillar I risk coverage rules amplifies 
the capital requirements for specific synthetic securitisations so as banks’ external 
                                                     
4 BIS 2008, Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf  
5 BIS 2009, Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf  
6 For more details about traditional and synthetic transactions, see in the previous sec-
tion, Process of Securitisation. 
7 BIS 2010, Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf  
8 BIS 2010, Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf  
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credit rating analysis for securitisation exposures is stricter.  Moreover, complicated 
securitisation transactions held in the trading book need considerably additional capi-
tal.  As far as pillar III – market discipline is concerned, the proposed directives in-
volved in securitisation exposures and supporting the off-balance sheet accounts and 
the regulatory guidelines referred to the way banks estimate their capital ratios.  
Meanwhile, on July 2010, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) an-
nounced its Consultation Paper (CP40) on guidelines to the new Article 122a of the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD)9.  This Article issued regulations as regards the 
minimum retention of the net economic interest at 5% for all banks, irrespectively of 
their role in the securitisation activity, originator, sponsor, original lender or investor.  
A credit institution, acting as originator, must release that it holds the retention por-
tion of 5% of the net economic interest and if it is in the investment field, it must ac-
cept certain due diligence measures before entering in the transaction. 
During the last two years, the European Commission is working on a proposal 
for a simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market in the European Un-
ion.  The outcome of ongoing meetings and councils was the introduction of two judi-
cial proposals, the Securitisation Regulation titled “REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down common rules on securitisation and 
creating a European framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation 
and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) 
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012”10 and a proposal to modify the Capital Require-
ments Regulation, named “REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms”11, both of them published on September, 30th 2015.  
The key intentions of these proposals are to build a viable securitisation market in or-
der to enhance the funding options in European economy for financial and non-
                                                     
9 Available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/106237/CP40.pdf   
10 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/securitisation/com-2015-
472_en.pdf   
11 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/securitisation/com-2015-
473_en.pdf  
  -15- 
financial institutions, to establish profitable, efficacious and safe risk allocation be-
tween the involving parts, especially the investors.  The European Union aims to obvi-
ate the revival of the days prior the 2008 crisis when complicated, unsecure transac-
tions lead to financial breakdown, increased probability of default and lack of liquidity.   
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
As it was mentioned above, the aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of se-
curitisation in the bank performance in terms of efficiency, profitability, and financial 
stability in means of leverage and asset quality.  In this section I discuss the existing 
theoretical and empirical academic literature on these issues and propose the basic 
concept of my research. 
3.1. Benefits and Defects of Securitisation 
The advantages and drawbacks of securitisation as an innovative technique in modern 
finance are appointed in many studies.  In this sub-chapter, I present a pros and cons 
analysis of securitisation from both theoretical and empirical literature.   
3.1.1. Theoretical approach   
The primary objective of every profit making company is to maximise the value of the 
firm and of its shareholders taking into account the future cash flows, when they occur 
and how risky they are.  From this perspective, through securitisation, originators and 
issuers could achieve efficient risk management, well-organised financial reconstitu-
tion and wide diversification in funding and liquidity (Jobst, 2005a).  Furthermore, re-
garding investors, they could also enjoy the benefits of diversification in means of low-
er transaction costs, entering in capital market with various levels of risk and respec-
tive return according to their investment profile and preferences (Fabozzi et al., 2006). 
As regards the funding and liquidity perspective, securitisation activity is sup-
posed to lower the cost of bank funding and enhance assets’ liquidity.  The process of 
securitisation has altered the way banks act as lenders.  Traditionally, banks provided 
loan products to borrowers and hold them in their balance sheet as assets until they 
are paid back, both capital and interest.  Pooling illiquid loans and selling them to sepa-
rate entities, special purpose vehicles, enables banks to fund their assets aside from 
trying to increase their deposits and retaining capital for deposit insurance schemes 
and reserve requirements.  Involving in securitisation, credit institutions are able to 
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offer loans to individuals and corporations and these assets can be distributed to spe-
cial purpose vehicles and thus be removed from the bank’s balance sheet (Loutskina 
and Strahan, 2007).  Henceforward, allowances are traded among banks and other fi-
nancial institutions, like mutual funds, which are willing to engage in debt finance mar-
ket “…where they could originate loans, sell the relating risks to a wide range of inves-
tors and thus remain insulated from potential defaults” (Arne, 2009).   
Risk management is considered to play one of the most significant roles in 
maintaining the financial stability of banking institutions.  The contribution of securiti-
sation via transferring the illiquid receivables to a separate entity and issuing liquid 
market investment products, attributes to the reduction of many types of risk involved 
in the assets if they remain on the balance sheet.  Asset-backed securities are thought 
to carry less investment risk than the underlying assets as they availed from diversifica-
tion and credit enhancements included at issuance.  Relocating the loans into off-
balance sheet accounts, banks could expediently fulfil the regulatory capital require-
ments.  Thus, capital and liquidity ratios are enhanced after a transaction takes place.  
According to Jones (2000), banks are able to lessen their monitoring risk standards, via 
regulatory capital arbitrage.  This process refers to the desire of the credit institutions 
to involve in cost rearrangement activities with the intention of reducing the cost of 
funding and improving their capital adequacy.  One of the most common capital ratios 
is Tier 1 and is calculated by dividing the shareholders equity to the risk weighted as-
sets, the portions of the weights attributed to each category of assets and the mini-
mum provisions for the ratio are imposed by the Basel Accord.  Since the equity is diffi-
cult and expensive to raise, the substitute available way to improve the ratio is to de-
crease the denominator, risk bearing assets.  Securitisation contributes to regulatory 
capital arbitrage because with the sale of allowances and other receivables in a sepa-
rate unit, banks do not undertake the relevant credit risk in their balance sheet and 
they can moderate their risk weighted assets and strengthen their capital ratios (Calo-
miris and Mason, 2004).  Moreover, banks with capital issues, like low-capitalised and 
less-capitalised ones, take advantage of the regulatory capital arbitrage provided by 
securitisation with intension to release capital for more profitable assets, receive high-
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er credit ratings or even hold capital greater than the minimum obliged to meet the 
market competition.    
Although, the abovementioned academic literature about the benefits of secu-
ritisation mostly covers the economic prosperity before the crisis of 2007/2008, there 
are studies that support the negative impact on financial institutions.  As stated by Ka-
ra et al. (2011), securitisation is responsible for banks’ credit expansion in risky invest-
ments and low quality assets and misleadingly is supposed to contribute in risk differ-
entiation.  In addition to this, Shin (2009) argues that if banks choose to lose their lend-
ing criteria and are involved in securitisation transactions, their financial stability is 
challenged.  His theory supports that credit unions after securitising their high quality 
assets, they extended their transferring activities to subprime loans.  Since not all the 
securities backed to the latter ended up to investors, banks were exposed to default 
risk through their relation with the special purpose vehicles that launched the transac-
tion.  Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) share this opinion and report that securitisation has 
encouraged lending institutions to administer loans with high probability of default 
and as they could backed them to high rated products and transferred them to final 
investors, they did not scrutinise the solvency of their possible clients.  This actually 
happened before the financial turmoil and as asset backed securities were very popu-
lar, banks and credit rating agencies neglected the significance of creditworthiness as-
sessment and transaction transparency and supervision (Hudson, 2009).  As Brun-
nermeier and Sannikov (2010) suggest, securitisation could increase bank leverage, 
even though risk transformation mitigates market imperfections.       
3.1.2. Empirical research 
The majority of the empirical studies concerning securitisation argue that it affects the 
profitability, leverage, efficiency and risk exposure of a credit institution.  Jiangli and 
Prisker (2008) are among the proponents of securitisation activities and claim that it 
results in higher profitability, gearing and lower insolvency risk of banks.  They ad-
dressed quarterly US bank holding company data from 2001 to 2007, mainly of mort-
gage securitisers, and via different approaches, they found that securitisation has a 
positive impact on bank performance.  They used data about mortgage securitisations 
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since they are the most common type of backed assets with mass transactions and so 
more data available.  They compared the average performance of large banks-
originators with others of the same size that did not securitised their assets.  The bank 
performance was evaluated by the return on equity ratio (ROE), time deposit premium 
and leverage ratio.  They also applied instrumental variable regression, using the bank 
size as an instrument because it influences the decision of a bank to securitise or not.  
The optimistic results contradict the financial crisis that had just burst out in 2008.  
However, Jiangli and Prisker explained it as the outcome of the previous developed 
period in banking securitisation.  
 Similar results about the positive relation between securitisation and profitabil-
ity were found by Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010).  In their study, they tried to deter-
mine the reasons that motivate bank securitisation decisions and they analyse four of 
them; alternative liquidity and funding techniques, managing risk exposure via trans-
ferring, new gain prospects and bank capitalisation.  They used annual individual data 
from all Italian banks from 2000, when the securitisation law was firstly enacted, until 
2006.  They applied their variables that express the four investigated determinants, 
which are total deposits to total assets (funding), bad loans to total loans (risk expo-
sure), return on equity -ROE- (profit opportunities) and supervisory capital to total as-
sets (capital), in probit and logit models and concluded in the fact that although in Italy 
securitisation activity was augmented, it did not ranged in adequate levels.  Moreover, 
lower profitability, liquidity, capitalisation and higher risk exposure had led banks to 
securitise their loans more often, in larger amounts and faster than those which do not 
face these problems.  In addition, big sized and well diversified banks with preceding 
experience in the securitisation market tend to be more active and they end up with 
comparably “low capital, fewer bad loans and deposits and they seem to reach higher 
profits”.12  Like the study of Jiangli and Prisker (2008), these results also refer to a peri-
od prior the financial crisis and therefore they are so encouraging.   
                                                     
12 Affinito, M., & Tagliaferri, E. (2010).  
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One of the most recent empirical studies on securitisation is that of Casu et al. 
(2013).  They intended to examine if securitisation actually upgraded the performance 
of bank institutions.  The used quarterly commercial bank data, from their financial 
statements for the period prior to crisis, i.e. second quarter of 2001 until fourth quar-
ter of 2008 and applied the tools of univariate analysis and propensity score matching 
approach.   Their univariate analysis shown that banks involved in securitisation are 
more profitable but also exposed to increased credit risk.  Moreover, those banks are 
likely to be more risk appetite, high leveraged, less profitable and have less liquidity.  
In order to evaluate the influence of securitisation on bank performance, they used the 
propensity score matching method and compared the performance of banks that secu-
ritise for the first time with others that did not get involved in this process.  The esti-
mated ratios expressed the following variables: cost of funding, credit risk, profitabil-
ity, interest income and expense structure, liquidity, loan portfolio, capital, and 
growth.  Unfortunately, they found no significant evidence that securitisation affects 
the bank performance due to poor underwriting and credit risk management methods 
applied by securitising banks and concluded that the benefits of securitisation may be 
offset by its drawbacks.  
To close the literature review on empirical research I introduce the study of 
Michalak and Uhde (2012).  They used a sample of securitisation transactions that 
were carried out by stock-listed bank holding companies in Western Europe and Swit-
zerland from 1997 to 2007.  They created a z-score technique to measure financial sta-
bility and calculated it as the sum of each bank’s return on average assets before taxes 
(ROAA) and equity capital in percentage of total assets and divide this sum with the 
standard deviation of ROAA calculated by a 3-year rolling window.  Their empirical re-
sults provide evidence that securitisation has an adverse impact on the originator’s 
bank soundness and profitability and has a positive relation with the bank’s return vol-
atility.  They also criticize encouragingly the attempts and proposals of the Basel Com-
mittee regarding transparency and supervisory in the securitisation market with the 
intention of preventing a future financial crisis. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
In this section I present the empirical part of the dissertation, suggest the available da-
taset used and describe the methodology applied with the intention of answering the 
main questions.  I am investigating the effects of securitisation on Greek banks’ per-
formance, deposits and allowances and on their financial stability as regards risk and 
efficiency.  Moreover, I compare the impact to a sample of banks from Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. 
4.1. Data and Sample Selection 
My sample consists of thirty three (33) banks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain that were involved in securitisation activities.  Since there are seven banks in 
Greece that participated in securitisation deals from November 2003 until December 
2014, I chose seven banks from each of the rest countries, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  As 
far as Ireland is concerned, the number of banks participated in the research is five due 
to the fact that in the majority of the transactions, the originators were non-financial 
corporations and thus balance sheet and income statement data were not available 
and comparable with those of the banks of the other countries.  Most of them were 
private companies or subsidiaries of banks that operate outside Ireland and neither 
Bankscope, nor Bloomberg or ThomsonOne could provide financial information.  For 
the other countries, I chose the financial institutes that carried out the larger number 
of securitisation transactions in this period and their data were available in the afore-
mentioned databases, in order to limit the “n.a.” sign in my sample.  The financial insti-
tutes from each country are presented in the next Table 1.   
In Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, there are some banks that were merged 
with or acquired by other financial institutions.  The names of the new banks are 
shown in Table 1, after the slash along with the year of the event.  Therefore, the data 
before the  
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Table 1: Banks from each country 
Country Bank Name 
Greece Alpha Bank AE 
 
Emporiki Bank of Greece SA / Alpha Bank AE in 2013 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 
Millennium Bank SA / Piraeus Bank SA in 2013 
National Bank of Greece SA 
Piraeus Bank SA 
T Bank S.A (Aspis Bank SA) / Eurobank Ergasias SA in 2011 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc 
 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland 
EBS Limited 
Permanent TSB Plc 
Ulster Bank Ireland Limited 
Italy Banca Italease SpA 
 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza Societa cooperativa per azioni 
Iccrea Holding SpA 
Intesa Sanpaolo 
Meliorbanca Group-Meliorbanca SpA / Banca popolare dell'Emilia Ro-
magna in 2012 
Veneto Banca scpa 
Portugal Banco Bic Portugues SA 
 
Banco BPI SA 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp 
Banco Espirito Santo SA/ Novo Banco in 2014 
Banco Santander Totta SA 
BANIF SGPS SA / Banif - Banco Internacional do Funchal S.A.  in 2012  
Caixa Economica Montepio Geral 
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
 
Banco de Sabadell SA 
Banco Popular Espanol SA 
Banco Santander SA 
Bankinter SA 
La Caixa / Caixabank SA in 2010 
Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Zaragoza, Aragon y Rioja-Ibercaja 
/ Ibercaja Banco SAU in 2010 
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merger or acquisition refer to the initial firm ID and then, since that year, to the new 
bank ID.  In case of Greece, there were originators that belong in the same group of 
financial companies and these are examined under the ID of the holding company as 
they are all of the same shared interests and their financial data were not all available 
for the examined period.   
I used annual data from 2003 until 2014 because the first Greek securitisation 
transaction took place on November 2003.  In the other countries, securitisation activi-
ties started in the early 1990s and especially Spain in 1993, Italy in 1995, Ireland in 
1996 and Portugal in 1997.  Since my main interest is about the securitisation in 
Greece, I restrict the date sample to the period of the entire Greek securitisation life 
until the last available fiscal year.  Consequently, since the considered period is twelve 
(12) years and the banks are thirty three (33), there are 396 observations formed in 
panel data for each examined variable, which I explain in the following section.  I col-
lected the financial data from Bankscope and the securitisation deals’ information 
from ThomsonOne.  The number of deals I examine in this dissertation for each coun-
try, from 2003 to 2014, is presented in the Table 2.  This number refers only to the 
specific banks that take part in this analysis and not to all banks from the five coun-
tries.      
Table 2: Number of Deals for each country 
Country Number of Deals 
Greece 48 
Ireland 37 
Italy 114 
Portugal 127 
Spain 367 
Total 693 
 
4.2. Description of Variables 
The variables that are used in the empirical model and the comparative analysis indi-
cate the figures I purpose to evaluate in this study.  These are performance, the level 
of deposits and loans, and financial stability, concerning productivity and risk.  The 
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main ratios that denote these variables are explained in this section.  As the financial 
statements do not reveal the types of securitised assets at each deal, the indicator that 
is used for securitisation is the number of deals per year and if there is no deal for a 
credit company, then it is equal to 0. 
The performance of the financial institution is reflected in its profitability and 
liquidity. The bank profitability is measured by return on average assets (ROAA) and it 
shows the portion of net income generated by the bank’s total assets.  An alternative 
ratio could be the return on average equity (ROAE), but in the sample I observed same 
extremely high prices which I had to omit as outliers and in order not to lessen my ob-
servations I chose to examine return on average assets (ROAA) for profitability.  The 
predictable impact of securitisation on the profits of a bank is dubious as according to 
literature it may have a positive or a negative sign.  In order to understand the impact 
of securitisation on the deposits and loans of a bank, the liquidity ratio is employed.  
The loan-to-deposit ratio measures the percentage of total loans to total customer de-
posits.  A ratio price above 1 (100%) indicates that a bank is less liquid and provides 
more loans than its deposits’ amount and is not able to cover its liabilities, so a ratio 
below 1 is preferable.  This ratio is expected to be negative related to securitisation as 
banks decide to involve in securitisation to increase their liquidity (Affinito and Ta-
gliaferri, 2010) or might have a positive correlation according to Casu et al. (2013).   
The second group of determinants refer to financial stability and especially 
bank efficiency and risk exposure.  The cost to income ratio (CIR) measures the reve-
nue generated per a unit of cost and it shows how much will it cost to a bank to yield a 
unit of income.  A low price for this ratio is a sign of an efficient performance and the 
effect of securitisation cannot be predicted with certainty.  On the subject of risk expo-
sure, I evaluate the Tier I ratio.  This ratio is calculated by dividing the shareholders’ 
equity to risk weighted assets and according to Basel III13 it must exceed 4.5% for a 
bank to fulfil the minimum capital adequacy requirements.  Securitisation is an innova-
tive technique of risk transferring and if banks decide to reduce the risk in their bal-
                                                     
13 BIS 2010, Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf 
  -25- 
ance sheet, they would securitise the riskier assets anticipating for a higher Tier I ratio.  
On the other hand, if they decide to securitise high quality assets of lower risk, the de-
nominator will be enhanced and result in worse ratio.     
The calculating formulas of the above mentioned variables are presented and 
summarised in Table 3.   
Table 3: Variables description and formulas 
Proxy Variable Formula 
Securitisation Securitisation 
Ratio 
Sum of Number of deals per year t, carried out by 
bank i  
Performance / 
Profitability 
Return on Av-
erage Assets 
(ROAA) 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
× 100 
Liquidity Perfor-
mance 
Loan to De-
posit ratio 
(LTD) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
 
Financial Stabil-
ity/Efficiency  
Cost to In-
come Ratio 
(CIR) 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
× 100 
Financial Stabil-
ity/Risk Exposure 
Tier I Ratio 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
4.3. Empirical Models  
In the last part of this Chapter, I am presenting the empirical models applied to find 
the correlation of securitisation on the abovementioned aspects of bank performance 
and financial stability.   
With the view to estimate these relationships, I assume that for each credit in-
stitution i, my measures of bank performance and financial stability are expressed by a 
linear function of the number of securitisation deals carried out by bank i at year t.  
Moreover, I have added a dummy variable for each bank in order for the models to 
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fulfil all the assumptions of the Gauss–Markov theorem.14  Thus, the regression models 
are: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (1) 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (2) 
𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (3) 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             (4) 
The above equations are applied in E-Views via ordinary least square regression 
with random effects to specify the effect of each bank in the model.  The random ef-
fects model approach is chosen instead of the fixed effects approach because a fixed 
effects model is more appropriate when the dataset is very large and represents a full 
population.  Contrariwise, random effects are more proper when the interest of inter-
pretation is about a population mean, like the case of this dissertation, where I exam-
ine only a small number of banks from 5 countries.  Therefore, the constant term has 
the subscript i that denotes the random effect of each individual financial institution 
and εit is an error term.  The dependant and explanatory variables are all expressed as 
ratios which were described in the previous section.  The results of the regressions are 
analysed in the next Chapter.   
 
 
 
                                                     
14 According to Gauss–Markov theorem, if the error terms of a linear regression 
model are uncorrelated, have zero mean, their variance is constant over time and they 
follow the normal distribution 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2), then the best, linear, unbiased estimators 
of the parameters model are provided by the ordinary least square method (Gujarati, 
2014).  
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Chapter 5. Data Analysis and Discussion   
In this chapter, the interpretation of the regression output of each model is introduced 
along with the evaluation of the results.  The chapter is separated in three sections, 
the descriptive statistics, the empirical findings and the comparative ratio analysis, a 
graph depiction of the ratios of all countries.   
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
In the Tables A 1 and A 2 of the Appendix, the descriptive statistics and the correlation 
matrix of all the variables are displayed respectively.  The number of observations is 
not the same for all the variables since there is lack of information in the available da-
tabases used, which retrieve the data from the annual reports of the financial institu-
tions. 
All the variables are expressed in ratios as is was described previously.  Return 
on average assets (ROAA) takes values below zero with minimum -13.468 and mean 
close to zero (-0.004) indicating that a large number of banks had losses from 2003 un-
til 2014.  In addition to this, negative values are also observed in Tier I ratio.  Since the 
risk weighted assets cannot be below zero as they are calculated by multiplying each 
group of assets with a percentage depending on risk, the negative value of the ratio is 
due to negative shareholder’s equity.  In particular, from the accounting point of view, 
this means that the book value of an assets is inferior of the value of liabilities on it.  
This phenomenon mainly derives from the accumulated losses of previous years and 
the way they are presented on the balance sheet of the credit institution.  These losses 
are transferred to the subsequent fiscal years until they are offset by future profits.  In 
my sample, negative Tier I values are observed in Greek banks on 2011 and 2012, years 
just before the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions and the recapitalisation of 
Greek banks occurred.   
 Extreme values are also noticed in the liquidity and cost to income ratio.  The 
maximum huge value of loan to deposit ratio of 466.932 comes from an Italian bank, 
Banca Italease SpA, which displayed very low amount of total customer deposits and 
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reciprocated in the financial crisis that had just touched the Italian Economy in 2008.  
Moreover, Banca Italeasa SpA belongs to a group of financial companies and thus this 
amount of deposits represents the total customer deposits of the bank and not of the 
group.  On the other hand, the bank efficiency ratio of Banco Bic Portugues SA takes 
the highest price of 526.674 on 2008.  This was probably a result of combining low 
profits of that year with high expenses. 
5.2. Empirical findings 
The regression outputs regarding the coefficient of the independent variables are pre-
sented in Table A 3 in the Appendix.   
 As we can observe from the regression results not all the explanatory variables 
are statistically significant and the R-squared metric of the models is very low.  At first, 
return on average assets (ROAA) was found positively related with the number of deals 
per year meaning that a transaction occurred in a bank a specific period can slightly 
increase the profitability of the bank.  This result is in accordance with other studies 
(Jiangli and Prisker, 2008) but it is very weak due to the low price of the coefficient 
(0.071, significant at 5% level).     
The Tier I capital ratio was also found significant in the respective model.  The 
results or the regression indicate that the impact of securitisation on Tier I ratio is 
strong significantly (at 1% level) different than zero and negative.  This means that a 
change in the number of deals per year influences adversely the capital adequacy of a 
financial institution as subject to the Basel Accord.  It may also mean that banks 
choose to securitise the high quality assets of their balance sheet and keep the riskier 
ones which would increase their risk exposure, as supported by Shin (2009).  In the 
case of this sample, the financial stability of the banks in terms of risk exposure is not 
enhanced by securitisation activities.  On the other hand, decreasing the number of 
deals leads to improvement of Tier I ratio and capital adequacy meaning that the ex-
amined sample of banks did not take advantage of the regulatory capital arbitrage 
provided by risk transferring though securitisation.   
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The remaining ratios were found not statistically significant in explaining the 
impact of securitisation.  The regression output for the liquidity model has shown that 
securitisation has no impact on the loan-to-deposit ratio of the banks in the sample as 
the coefficient of this variables is 0 and so does the R-squared.  A possible meaning is 
the fact that there are lots of other factors that affect this ratio at a greater extend like 
the portion of non-performing loans to gross loans, the ratio of loan loss reserves to 
gross loans, the percentage of customer deposits and loans to total assets.  An empiri-
cal model is formulated as follows: 
𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1 ×
𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2 ×
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3 ×
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽4 ×
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (5) 
Testing the impact of these ratios individually using the same approach, I have 
found that they are all significantly different than zero at 95% confidence level.  The 
results of this regression are presented in Table A 4 in the Appendix.  As far as the cost 
to income ratio is concerned, there is no evidence that it is affected by securitisation in 
the current sample.  If I could add more banks in my data set, this ratio may turn to be 
significantly affected in the changes in the number of deals per year, as the p-value of 
this coefficient in the model was a slightly superior than 0.10 (p=0.117). 
Unfortunately, the price of R-squared in all regression models is very low.  A 
possible explanation is that the research is restricted in a very small sample.  I used on-
ly 33 banks from the countries I wanted to examine because my intense was to com-
pare and contrast the results among the different countries.  The reporting period is 
sufficient as it lasts more than a decade and covers the years before and after the re-
cent financial turmoil.    
5.3. Comparative Ratio Analysis  
In order to evaluate and compare the impact of securitisation in the performance of 
the banks for each different country independently, I used the ratio analysis.  It would 
be specifically the analysis of the trend of the indicators that were found that to be 
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significantly affected by the securitisation deals over time.  The ratios were explained 
in the previous chapter, in the description of variables section.   
Before proceeding to the analysis, I will briefly outline the methodology ap-
plied.  After collecting the data for each ratio of the thirty three credit institutions from 
the BankScope database, I split them according to which country the banks are locat-
ed.  Then I sorted them in chronological order from older to more recent so that I 
could get the average of each ratio per year.  In the graphs that follow and also in the 
tables that escort them, we can observe the average bank ratio of ROAA and Tier I and 
the sum of deals per year for all the banks that participated in securitisations in the 
respective period.  The number of deals is displayed in bars and the ratios in lines with 
different colours to distinguish between them. 
 
Figure 2: Key ratios, Greece 
Starting with Greece, we can observe in Figure 2 above that the deals have 
been augmented from 2004 to 2009, with 2006 to be the most active year in securiti-
sation.  The ROAA of the Greek Banks was negative in most years except for 2005, 
2007 and 2008 meaning that securitisation did not improve profitability as it was the 
initial aim of the banks.  It takes a very low and negative value on 2006 which is the 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No of Deals 3 3 9 14 6 5 7 0 1 0 0 0
ROAA -0,06 -0,10 0,75 -0,50 0,59 0,05 -0,21 -0,36 -6,59 -2,74 2,10 -0,98
Tier 1 11,50 9,82 9,95 9,84 8,66 7,79 10,74 11,24 4,70 7,22 14,32 15,17
-10,00
-5,00
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
R
O
A
A
, T
ie
r 
1
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
ea
ls
Greece: Key Ratios 
  -31- 
year with the peak of deals.  The nethermost value of -6.59 is observed on 2011 but 
then the securitisation activity was restricted to only one deal that took place at that 
year and so I cannot claim that it improved the profitability thereafter nor that the lack 
of deals had led to the downfall of both the ratios.  They were probably affected by the 
prolonged recession in the Greek economy.  After 2011 there is an increase that is pre-
sumably explained by other factors, like mergers and acquisitions that enhanced the 
financial stability of all the banks.  This can also be confirmed by the trend of Tier I, 
which was declining the previous years of active securitisation, i.e. 2003-2008, and on-
ly in 2008 it started to rise until a sharp drop in 2011 and from 2012 until present, it is 
enhanced.  The upward trend of the recent years may be a result of the Greek banks 
attempt to became more solvent and robust with the aim of fulfilling the Basel Com-
mittee requirements.  The overall trend of both the ratios is similar meaning that the 
empirical findings of inverse relationship between the number of deals and ROAA and 
Tier I is not established in case of Greece.     
 
Figure 3: Key ratios, Ireland 
Moving to Ireland, Figure 3 presents the key ratios of the five Irish banks that 
participated in the survey.  The first think that we observe in the graph is that until the 
financial crisis of 2007, both ROAA and Tier 1 were nearly stable.  After that Tier I is   
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No of Deals 9 0 0 3 0 15 10 0 0 0 0 0
ROAA 0,95 0,76 0,71 0,82 0,73 0,02 -1,03 -3,22 -1,73 -3,09 -3,03 1,69
Tier 1 8,60 8,85 8,37 8,94 8,73 9,21 8,41 8,74 14,20 13,26 12,24 15,16
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rising showing a sufficient capital adequacy and financial stability, but the profitability 
is getting worse and takes negative values.  This has happened probably because banks 
in Ireland experienced losses at that period and the amount of their assets was de-
clined.  The banks that I examine did not carry out any securitisation transactions from 
2009 until present indicating that they did not choose this way to increase they profit-
ability and enhance their financial stability.  This opposite trend of the two ratios after 
the outbreak of the financial crisis confirms the findings of the regression results.      
Next country in the analysis is Italy.  Figure 4 shows that on average the seven 
Italian banks I chose to evaluate were active in securitisation with lots of deals every 
year.  While, the banks’ profitability (ROAA) seemed unchanged the first examined 
years of securitisation, one year before the burst of crisis, on 2006, this ratio started a 
downward trend with negative values.  This indicates that Italian banks did not benefit 
 
Figure 4: Key ratios, Italy 
from the securitisation measured as numbers of deals per year, a situation that is ob-
servable even recently.  As far as financial stability is concerned and expressed by Tier 
I, it fluctuates before crisis following the trend of securitisation deals and is rising af-
terwards fulfilling the Basel Accord requirements.  The banks continue to securitise 
with a lower volume and their capital adequacy remained enhanced.     
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No of Deals 12 12 17 17 16 12 15 0 4 1 3 5
ROAA 0,77 0,58 0,71 0,64 0,26 -0,71 -0,37 0,47 -0,11 -0,19 -0,46 -1,09
Tier 1 8,05 7,89 9,32 8,97 7,80 9,83 12,07 16,42 17,92 17,43 17,99 15,00
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The Portuguese banks that participate in the research,  took advantage of secu-
ritisation benefits until 2007, as presented in Figure 5.  Sufficient number of deals had 
led to the increase of ROAA and Tier I before crisis.  From 2007, the year with the most 
deals, and beyond, the profitability started to decline taking negative values and this 
has not been restored yet.  Furthermore, as the securitisation activity is weakened, 
profitability follows the same trend.  On the contrary, Tier I is enriched and it could be 
stated that the gradual decreased in the number of securitisation deals has affected 
positively the ratio.  No presence of deals in the last three years has not worsened 
ROAA but enlarged Tier I.  This is in accordance with the empirical findings of the re-
gression analysis where Tier I was adversely related the number of deals.  The situation 
where the two ratios take a different route after the recession is also observed here. 
 
Figure 5: Key ratios, Portugal 
   Last but not least, the most active in securitisation transactions country is 
Spain.  Figure 6 points out that the Spanish banks of the survey participated in lots of 
deals from 2003 until 2009 with a sharp drop on years 2007, 2010 and onwards.  Their 
profitability measured by return on average assets (ROAA) was fixed until 2007, year 
with its highest value (1.00) and then started to decrease taking even negative sign 
(2012).  This trend is common to the other countries too and indicates that the in-
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
No of Deals 16 11 17 10 25 18 15 11 4 0 0 0
ROAA 0,88 0,98 1,41 2,12 1,83 -0,20 0,15 0,36 -0,72 -0,41 -0,77 -0,71
Tier 1 6,86 7,12 6,28 6,87 5,96 10,46 9,76 8,70 9,12 11,50 12,00 10,35
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creased volume of securitisation activity before the eruption of subprime credit reces-
sion did not affect the profitability, as it was probably purposed by the banks.  On the 
other hand, risk exposure measured by Tier I was declined as the number of securitisa-
tion deals increased and vis versa confirming the negative relationship found in the 
regression analysis.  When the deals decreased after 2008, the ratio augmented rapid-
ly.  Like it was observed in the banks from the previous countries, except Greece, the 
tendency of both the ratios is opposite after 2007-2008, verifying the regression out-
puts of the previous section.            
 
Figure 6: Key ratios, Spain. 
 Finally, the overall assessment of the comparative analysis generates both con-
sistent and contradictory results.  The ratios of all the countries are affected by the se-
curitisation index created for the purpose of this dissertation, i.e. the number of deals 
per year, in the same way before the financial turmoil of 2007.  This trend confirms the 
theory and the empirical findings of previous studies (Jiangli and Prisker (2008), Shin 
(2009)).  Then, in Greece the average banks ratios continue to move in the same direc-
tion, whereas in the rest of the countries return on average assets (ROAA) and Tier I 
follow different paths.  By virtue of the fact that after 2009, only one deal was closed 
in Greece, we cannot claim that securitisation is responsible for the movements of the 
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ROAA 0,94 0,76 0,87 0,96 1,00 0,73 0,57 0,50 0,36 -0,26 0,22 0,35
Tier 1 7,58 7,71 7,48 7,20 6,92 7,79 8,60 9,42 10,60 10,63 11,71 11,92
-2,00
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
R
O
A
A
, T
ie
r 
1
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
D
ea
ls
Spain: Key Ratios
  -35- 
ratios since the latter are affected by many other factors, the analysis of which goes 
beyond the limits of this dissertation.  The common trend observed in the key ratios of 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain may be attributable to securitisation because these 
countries are involved in greater number deals and more frequently, being more ade-
quate and reliable in testing such impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this dissertation, I tried to explore and analyse the impact of securitisation in the 
bank performance using a unique data sample of bank ratios from Greece, Ireland, Ita-
ly, Portugal and Spain.  The sample consists of thirty three banks, five from Ireland and 
seven from the rest countries.  The examined period refers to the last twelve years 
covering sufficiently the era before and after the burst of the recent financial turmoil.   
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After defining the securitisation process and introducing the legal framework in 
Greece and Europe, I presented the literature review of previous and related papers.  
The literature review contains both theoretical and empirical studies.   Next, in the 
methodology section, the applied empirical models of the research were proposed.  
The structure of the models allows the study of the relation of securitisation, meas-
ured by the number of securitisation deals per year, with the profitability, liquidity and 
financial stability in terms of efficiency and risk exposure.  The corresponding ratios 
employed are return on average assets (ROAA), loans-to-deposits ratio, cost-to-income 
ratio and Tier I.  The regression analysis findings have shown that return on average 
assets (ROAA) and Tier I are affected by the securitisation at 95% and 99% confidence 
level respectively.  Return on average assets (ROAA) was found to have a positive rela-
tion with securitisation whereas Tier I was proved to move in a different direction.  
This is consistent with the literature review, as Jiangli and Prisker (2008) provide evi-
dence that securitisation increased the bank profitability prior the subprime crisis of 
2007.  The inverse relationship between securitisation and capital adequacy confirms 
the findings of the study conducted by Shin (2009), were he argues that banks’ finan-
cial stability is challenged with the use of securitisation as it does not reduce their risk 
exposure.   
The R-squared of all the models turned up to be very low.  A possible explana-
tion is the small size of the sample because I only examined thirty three banks.  Re-
garding Greece, these seven banks have carried out all the forty eight securitisation 
transactions from the enactment of the securitisation law.  As for the rest of the coun-
tries, the banks that I chose to examine are the most active ones in the securitisation 
market and with available data in Bankscope so that I have the fewest blanks in my da-
taset.  The selection of the same number of credit institutions from each country ser-
vices the purpose of comparison.  Perhaps I had to form my sample in such a way that 
covers the majority of securitisation activity in the other countries, but in this case I 
would have had to search for data in a large number of banks in four different coun-
tries with probable lack of data availability.  Moreover, many originators are non-
financial institutions and the appraisal of the ratios could not be trustworthy.  
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My data are formed in unbalanced panel structure.  Although this approach 
provides more information, increased variability and efficacy, more degrees of free-
dom and less collinearity, it suffers from “goodness” in model fitting and results in low 
R-squared values.  Had it possible to examine and evaluate each credit institution indi-
vidually with more inside information, for example via questionnaires about the way 
they encounter securitisation, the results would be more reliable and accurate.   
Another limitation of my empirical research that probably resulted in low ex-
planatory aspect of the models I used, is the securitisation variable.  I counted the 
number of securitisation deals each credit institution carried out every year because I 
did not have access to the amount of their securitised loans.  This account is not pre-
sented in the balance sheet and therefore databases like Bankscope, Bloomberg and 
ThomsonOne did not display any further information.  After the late proposals for a 
simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market introduced by the Europe-
an Commission on September 2015, the information for this kind of transactions would 
probably be reachable to all the involved and interested parts.     
In the last part of discussion, I compare and contrast among the countries the 
ratios that were found importantly affected by securitisation.  Using the average val-
ues of the ratios of each year and the illustrative graphs, I presented the trend of each 
metric over time for all the examined countries.  This trend analysis is in accordance 
with the empirical results of regression for all the countries except Greece, where the 
tendency of both ratios is similar over time.  This means that securitisation in Greece 
did not affect the average profitability and risk exposure of the banks as in the most 
active years, these aspects remained mainly unchanged.  In all the graphs, it is obvious 
that after the eruption of the recent financial crisis the securitisation activity has been 
limited or even disappeared.  This is probably because securitisation has been accused 
of the increase in default and insolvency of the financial institutions as they transfer 
their risky assets in a separate special purpose vehicle and the securities issued by the 
latter were incorrectly and on purpose rated as high quality ones.  Banks with the fear 
of experiencing the unfavourable consequences of securitisation, increase of credit risk 
and insolvency and decline of profitability and efficiency, decided to manage their ac-
counting and risk issues without the use of innovative techniques.  After all, the bank-
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ing system of each country is different and withstands in sudden shocks like the secu-
ritisation market pitfall, bearing its own pathogenesis and establishing suitable healing 
processes.     
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
ROAA  -0,004 0,394 8,006 -1,346 2,057 396 
LTD  4,560 1,460 4,669 0,638 2,746 396 
CIR  6,915 6,026 5,267 2,417 4,552 394 
TIER I  1,011 9,140 4,464 -8,800 5,019 382 
No of Deals  1,750 0,000 3,000 0,000 3,669 396 
 
Table A 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
ROAA  LTD  CIR  TIER I  
No of 
Deals   
ROAA  1,000     
LTD  -0,128 1,000    
CIR  -0,362 0,021 1,000   
TIER I  -0,014 0,095 0,279 1,000  
No of Deals  0,146 -0,008 -0,117 -0,216 1,000 
 
Table A 3: Regression Analysis ROAA, LTD, CIR, TIER I 
OLS regression analysis of the above ratios on the number of deals per year.  
Variables ROAA LTD CIR TIER I 
No of Deals 0.071 0.000 -1.004 -0.290 
(0.03)** (0.36) (0.64) (0.07)*** 
Constant -0.128 4.563 70.967 10.638 
(0.14) (2.96) (3.83)*** (0.45)*** 
Observations 396 396 394 382 
R2 0.015 0.00 0.006 0.044 
In the parenthesis we can see the standard error and the significance.  *** Indicates statisti-
cal significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and * indi-
cates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table A 4: Regression Analysis Liquidity ratio 
OLS regression analysis of the LTD on a set of independent variables.  
Variables LTD 
Loan loss reserves/Gross 
Loans 
-1.093 
(0.55)** 
Impaired loans / Gross 
Loans 
0.894 
(0.28)*** 
Total customer deposits / 
Total assets 
-56.468 
(10.73)*** 
Loans/Total assets 38.212 
(14.70)*** 
Constant 2.098 
(10.32) 
Observations 379 
R2 0.12 
In the parenthesis we can see the standard error and the significance.  *** Indicates statisti-
cal significance at the 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, and * indi-
cates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
